BGP-præfiksopslag
Indtast et præfiks (eller en enkelt adresse). Besvares fra vores daglige kopi af den globale routingtabel.
168.126.0.0/16
Annonceret præcist
- 168.126.0.0/16AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.0.0
- Register
- APNIC · Sydkorea · 20. apr. 1994
- Tildelt blok
- 168.126.0.0 – 168.126.255.255
Dækkende ruter
Ingen mindre specifik rute dækker det.
Mere specifikke ruter
- 168.126.27.0/24AS9490Oscar EnterpriseRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.27.0
- 168.126.80.0/24AS45399Hanjin Information Systems Telecommunication Co., LtdRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.80.0
- 168.126.81.0/24AS45399Hanjin Information Systems Telecommunication Co., LtdRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.81.0
- 168.126.82.0/24AS45399Hanjin Information Systems Telecommunication Co., LtdRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.82.0
- 168.126.83.0/24AS45399Hanjin Information Systems Telecommunication Co., LtdRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.83.0
- 168.126.120.0/22AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICERPKI Ikke fundet168.126.120.0
- 168.126.137.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.137.0
- 168.126.140.0/23AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.140.0
- 168.126.146.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.146.0
- 168.126.150.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.150.0
- 168.126.211.0/24AS38695bucheon universityRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.211.0
- 168.126.244.0/24AS38695bucheon universityRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.244.0
- 168.126.245.0/24AS9767DB Inc.RPKI Ikke fundet168.126.245.0
- 168.126.246.0/24AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Ikke fundet168.126.246.0
Denne tekst findes endnu ikke på dansk. Den vises på engelsk, indtil en oversættelse er udgivet.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 158.36.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Ofte stillede spørgsmål
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.