BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
61.183.0.0/16
Announced exactly
- 61.183.0.0/16AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Valid61.183.0.0
- Registry
- APNIC · China · Nov 16, 2000
- Delegated block
- 61.183.0.0 – 61.183.255.255
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 61.183.8.0/23AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.8.0
- 61.183.10.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.10.0
- 61.183.11.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.11.0
- 61.183.12.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.12.0
- 61.183.42.0/24AS148981China TelecomRPKI Valid61.183.42.0
- 61.183.52.0/24AS136191YICHANG, Hubei Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid61.183.52.0
- 61.183.64.0/18AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.64.0
- 61.183.64.0/24AS58563CHINANET Hubei province networkRPKI Valid61.183.64.0
- 61.183.65.0/24AS58563CHINANET Hubei province networkRPKI Valid61.183.65.0
- 61.183.128.0/18AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.128.0
- 61.183.129.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.129.0
- 61.183.130.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.130.0
- 61.183.146.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.146.0
- 61.183.164.0/22AS58563CHINANET Hubei province networkRPKI Valid61.183.164.0
- 61.183.189.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.189.0
- 61.183.190.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.190.0
- 61.183.192.0/18AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.192.0
- 61.183.225.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid61.183.225.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 158.36.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.