BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
2620:1ec::/36
Announced exactly
- 2620:1ec::/36AS8075Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec::
- Registry
- ARIN · United States · Mar 11, 2015
- Delegated block
- 2620:1ec:: – 2620:1ec:fff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 2620:1ec:4::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:4::
- 2620:1ec:5::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:5::
- 2620:1ec:6::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:6::
- 2620:1ec:7::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:7::
- 2620:1ec:9::/48AS8075Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:9::
- 2620:1ec:a::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:a::
- 2620:1ec:b::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:b::
- 2620:1ec:c::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:c::
- 2620:1ec:d::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:d::
- 2620:1ec:12::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:12::
- 2620:1ec:13::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:13::
- 2620:1ec:1d::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:1d::
- 2620:1ec:21::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:21::
- 2620:1ec:22::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:22::
- 2620:1ec:23::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:23::
- 2620:1ec:24::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:24::
- 2620:1ec:25::/48AS8075Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:25::
- 2620:1ec:28::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:28::
- 2620:1ec:34::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:34::
- 2620:1ec:42::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:42::
- 2620:1ec:43::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:43::
- 2620:1ec:44::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:44::
- 2620:1ec:45::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:45::
- 2620:1ec:8f0::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:8f0::
- 2620:1ec:8fc::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:8fc::
- 2620:1ec:900::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:900::
- 2620:1ec:90c::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:90c::
- 2620:1ec:a92::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:a92::
- 2620:1ec:c11::/48AS8068Microsoft CorporationRPKI Valid2620:1ec:c11::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 158.36.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.