BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
240e:a6::/31
Announced exactly
- 240e:a6::/31AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Valid240e:a6::
- Registry
- APNIC · China · May 20, 2010
- Delegated block
- 240e:: – 240e:ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
More-specific routes
- 240e:a6::/35AS134419BeihaiRPKI Valid240e:a6::
- 240e:a7:7fc0::/48AS140508CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc0::
- 240e:a7:7fc1::/48AS140508CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc1::
- 240e:a7:7fc2::/48AS140508CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc2::
- 240e:a7:7fc3::/48AS140509CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province NanNing 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc3::
- 240e:a7:7fc4::/48AS140509CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province NanNing 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc4::
- 240e:a7:7fc5::/48AS140509CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province NanNing 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc5::
- 240e:a7:7fc6::/48AS140510CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province LiuZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc6::
- 240e:a7:7fc7::/48AS140510CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province LiuZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc7::
- 240e:a7:7fc8::/48AS140510CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province LiuZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc8::
- 240e:a7:7fc9::/48AS140511CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province GuiLin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fc9::
- 240e:a7:7fca::/48AS140511CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province GuiLin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fca::
- 240e:a7:7fcb::/48AS140511CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province GuiLin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fcb::
- 240e:a7:7fcc::/48AS140512CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province YuLin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fcc::
- 240e:a7:7fcd::/48AS140512CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province YuLin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fcd::
- 240e:a7:7fce::/48AS140512CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province YuLin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fce::
- 240e:a7:7fcf::/48AS140513CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province BaiSe 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fcf::
- 240e:a7:7fd0::/48AS140513CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province BaiSe 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd0::
- 240e:a7:7fd1::/48AS140513CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province BaiSe 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd1::
- 240e:a7:7fd2::/48AS140514CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province GuiGang 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd2::
- 240e:a7:7fd3::/48AS140514CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province GuiGang 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd3::
- 240e:a7:7fd4::/48AS140514CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province GuiGang 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd4::
- 240e:a7:7fd5::/48AS140515CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province HeChi 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd5::
- 240e:a7:7fd6::/48AS140515CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province HeChi 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd6::
- 240e:a7:7fd7::/48AS140515CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province HeChi 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd7::
- 240e:a7:7fd8::/48AS140516CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province QinZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd8::
- 240e:a7:7fd9::/48AS140516CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province QinZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fd9::
- 240e:a7:7fda::/48AS140516CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province QinZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fda::
- 240e:a7:7fdb::/48AS140517CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province WuZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fdb::
- 240e:a7:7fdc::/48AS140517CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province WuZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fdc::
- 240e:a7:7fdd::/48AS140517CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province WuZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fdd::
- 240e:a7:7fde::/48AS140518CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province BeiHai 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fde::
- 240e:a7:7fdf::/48AS140518CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province BeiHai 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fdf::
- 240e:a7:7fe0::/48AS140518CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province BeiHai 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe0::
- 240e:a7:7fe1::/48AS140519CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province ChongZuo 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe1::
- 240e:a7:7fe2::/48AS140519CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province ChongZuo 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe2::
- 240e:a7:7fe3::/48AS140519CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province ChongZuo 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe3::
- 240e:a7:7fe4::/48AS140520CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province LaiBin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe4::
- 240e:a7:7fe5::/48AS140520CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province LaiBin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe5::
- 240e:a7:7fe6::/48AS140520CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province LaiBin 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe6::
- 240e:a7:7fe7::/48AS140521CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province HeZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe7::
- 240e:a7:7fe8::/48AS140521CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province HeZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe8::
- 240e:a7:7fe9::/48AS140521CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province HeZhou 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fe9::
- 240e:a7:7fea::/48AS140522CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province FangChengGang 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fea::
- 240e:a7:7feb::/48AS140522CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province FangChengGang 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7feb::
- 240e:a7:7fec::/48AS140522CHINATELECOM GUANGXI province FangChengGang 5G networkRPKI Valid240e:a7:7fec::
- 240e:a7:8800::/37AS134419BeihaiRPKI Valid240e:a7:8800::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 158.36.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.